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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
SALT LAKE CITY, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
JENNIFER KAY WOOD, 
Defendant / Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
Case No. 981670-CA 
Priority Is. . 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
This matter is an appeal from a judgment and conviction for engaging in an activity 
violation of Salt Lake City Code §5.28.030. The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction in this 
matter pursuant to Utah Code Ann § ) 8 2a 3(2)(e) (1996), 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARD OF REVIEW 
Issue for Review. 
(I) Is the ordinance under which the defendant was convicted invalid on its face as a 
violation of the "freedom, u ow^s.. clause of the First Amendment of the United States 
Constitution, or similar protections under Article I, Section 15 of the Constitution of Utah? 
Standard of Review. 
With regard to questions of law, the trial court is given little discretion. According]), the 
trial court's conclusions of law are accorded little deference by the reviewing court and are 
reviewe* 1 for correctness State v.. Heaton, 342 I Itaii 1 R • :p 19 ( [ Jit; ill 1998); State v. Deli, 
861 P.2d431 (Utah 1991): State v. Petersen, 810P.2d421 (Utah 1991). 
RELEVANT CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES AND RULES 
Salt Lake City Code § 5.28.030 states in pertinent part: 
It is unlawful: 
(c) A. For any person to perform as a professional dancer on the premises of an 
establishment as defined in this chapter, either gratuitously or for compensation; 
without first obtaining a license therefor;.... 
The ordinance is set out in full as an addendum in the Brief of Appellant and will not be 
repeated here. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The defendant, Jennifer Kay Wood, was charged by Information with having committed 
the offense of engaging in an activity for which a license is required without having first obtained 
such license on November 8, 1997, in violation of § 5.28.030 of the Salt Lake City Code. On 
January 13,1998, the defendant appeared at an arraignment and entered a plea of not guilty to the 
charge. Following entry of the plea, a number of pretrial conference hearings were conducted. A 
motion filed by the defendant challenging the constitutionality of the ordinance was argued and 
on March 16, 1998, the trial judge denied defendant's motion. On September 15,1998, the 
matter was heard as a bench trial with the Honorable William W. Barrett, Judge presiding, and 
the defendant was found guilty. The defendant filed a notice of appeal on October 9, 1998. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On November 8, 1997, the defendant, among others, was working as a performer in an 
establishment licensed to serve alcoholic beverages called "Runway 69" in Salt Lake City, Utah. 
Several detectives from the Salt Lake City Police Department "Vice Squad" were present to 
determine whether various ordinances were being violated. R. 55 at 4,10-11, 43-48. 
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During the performance on November 8, 1997, a number of the performers, including the 
defendant, were observed dancing on an elevated platform in the establishment. R. 55 at 4-8. 
The performers would take the stage singularly and with the accompaniment of music would 
strip off their outer garments until they were clothed only in a brassier and thong-type panties. 
R. 55 at 4-6, 20, 43-45. While the girls danced, a number of male patrons were observed stuffing 
dollar bills into the brassier tops and panties of some of the performers. R. 55 at 6, 8-9, 25, 46. 
It was determined, primarily from statements of the performers themselves, that most of the 
performers were under the age of 21 and that, in fact, most of them were regularly employed at a 
nude/semi -nude establishment called "American Bush," located in an adjacent city. R. 55 at 27-
28, 40. An assertion was made to the Vice detectives that the girls were only "modeling" the 
lingerie. However, at no time were any announcements made to that effect, no order forms were 
available for purchase of any items of clothing, no information was provided regarding the 
purchase of any items of clothing being modeled, nor were any purchasing agents apparently 
present at the event. R. 55 at 9-10. The patrons at this performance were almost exclusively 
male. The parties stipulated that for the purposes of this prosecution the facility involved was an 
"establishment" as that term is defined in the ordinance. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Salt Lake City has enacted an ordinance, Chapter 5.28 of the Salt Lake City Code, that 
regulates dancing as entertainment in establishments licensed to serve alcoholic beverages under 
circumstances where Sexually Oriented Business (S.O.B.) licenses are not required. Chapter 
5.28 requires, among other things, that the performers are at least 21 years or age, minimum 
costume coverage requirements, that the performers are not permitted to have physical contact 
with or accept money directly from customers, and similar common sense requirements. Since 
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the licensees are not required to have S.O.B. licenses, acquiring a license under Chapter 5.28 
would make them aware of the requirements. These requirements are content-neutral time, place 
and manner regulations for licensed business establishments within the jurisdiction of Salt Lake 
City. The regulations do not improperly impinge upon conduct protected as expressive under the 
First Amendment or the Utah State Constitution. Therefore, the conviction of the defendant for 
engaging in an activity for which a license is required without having first obtained such license, 
in violation of § 5.28.030 of the Salt Lake City Code, should be affirmed. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1. 
NEITHER CHAPTER 5.28 OF THE SALT LAKE CITY CODE 
NOR THE CONDUCT OF THE DEFENDANT MERIT STRICT 
SCRUTINY REVIEW UNDER THE FIRST AMENDMENT TO 
THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION. 
At one point in these proceedings, the defense counsel asserted that his clients were doing 
nothing more than runway modeling of shorts, lingerie, and bathing suits. If this is true, then one 
would be hard pressed to determine what, if any, "message" the performers were intending to 
communicate by their conduct. Of course, if there was no intended message, then there was no 
activity protected by the First Amendment. While the activity of "runway modeling" could be 
construed as commercial speech, the ordinance in question does not purport to regulate that 
activity and there would be no offense. Since the establishment in which the performances were 
conducted served food and drink, one can readily see the business reality of having scantily clad 
young women performing while the customers swilled beer and ate kabobs - well mainly swilled 
beer. However, the conviction here is for dancing as entertainment in an establishment licensed 
to serve alcoholic beverages, not modeling, and that activity is one for which a license is required 
by the ordinance in question. 
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The ordinance in the present matter requires that those who dance as entertainment in 
establishments holding a license to serve alcoholic beverages must be licensed and must meet 
certain other requirements including a minimum age, costume coverage, avoidance of lewd 
activities, and no physical contact with patrons. These requirements are similar to certain of the 
requirements to which the establishment must adhere under the Alcoholic Beverage Control Act, 
Title 32A, Utah Code. The pertinent requirements for private clubs holding liquor licenses are 
found in Section 32A-4-106 of Chapter 4, Title 32A of the Alcoholic Beverage Control Act; the 
pertinent requirements for establishments holding on-premise beer retailer licenses are found in 
Section 32A-10-206 of Chapter 10, Title 32A of the Alcoholic Beverage Control Act. 
The defendant contends that the ordinance violates the First Amendment by restricting 
free expression; and that, therefore, these requirements warrant strict scrutiny. When the 
Framers fashioned the words that "Congress shall make no law...abridging the freedom of 
speech,..." it was fairly clear from the historical context that the primary desire was to protect the 
spoken and written word. Certainly the criticism of the most recent governmental folly by a fiery 
orator perched on an apple crate in the village square and similar musings of Old Ben in Poor 
Richards Almanac were intended to be strictly protected. However, even then, as now, few 
things were absolutes. 
Two prominent themes have appeared in history to justify the protection of speech. One 
of those themes emphasized the value of free speech in promoting individual self-expression and 
self-realization; the other stressed the value of freedom of expression for a system of 
representative democracy and self-government. A frequent argument voiced to justify the 
protection of speech, which is related to both of these themes, is the utility of free expression in 
promoting the search for knowledge and "truth" in the "marketplace of ideas." All of these 
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rationales and arguments have appeared in the opinions of some of our most respected jurists. In 
Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937), Justice Cardozo noted that free speech is "the matrix, 
the indispensable condition, of nearly every other form of freedom." Justice Brandeis, 
concurring in Whitney v. California, 247 U.S. 357 (1927), wrote "Those who won our 
independence believed that the final end of the State was to make men free to develop their 
faculties.... They believed that freedom to think as you will and to speak as you think are means 
indispensable to the discovery and spread of political truth...that public discussion is a political 
duty; and that this should be a fundamental principle of the American government." Justice 
Holmes' dissent in Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616 (1919), stated that "the best test of 
truth is the power of the thought to get itself accepted in the competition of the market...." All 
of these lofty statements notwithstanding, and given the fact that the Constitution is a dynamic 
document, the concept of free speech has undergone somewhat of a metamorphosis. Now the 
clause extends, at least to some degree, to conduct beyond the written and spoken word, so much 
so that the clause is now commonly referred to as "freedom of expression" rather than freedom 
of speech. 
To compensate for the expansion of the doctrine, the Supreme Court developed an 
approach that led to a hierarchy of preference in matters of free expression. Justice Holmes 
recognized in his opinion in Abrams that First Amendment immunity for speech, press, and 
assembly has to be reconciled with valid but conflicting governmental interests. Likewise, 
Justice Brandeis noted in Whitney that "although the rights of free speech and assembly are 
fundamental, they are not in their nature absolute." Finally, in Konigsberg v. State Bar of 
California, 366 U.S. 36 (1961), a case involving a refusal on First Amendment grounds to answer 
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questions on a bar admission form about affiliation with the Communist Party, Justice Harlan's 
majority opinion rejected the view that freedom of speech and association are absolutes. 
In later cases, the Court engaged in a categorization approach in which some bright lines 
were drawn to distinguish expressions protected by the First Amendment from those outside the 
"freedom of speech." Political expression was in, while "fighting words" and "obscenity" were 
out. Therefore, before any balancing of interests or categorization could occur, a determination 
of the nature of the expression sought to be protected was necessary. 
In keeping with the historical perspective, expression of opinion in the printed form, as in 
books and newspapers, occupies a favored position in First Amendment jurisprudence. This is 
particularly true for the expression of political opinion. This sort of expression of opinion is 
considered a core value of the First Amendment and is known as "pure speech." On the other 
end of the spectrum from such "pure speech" are those matters where speech is joined with 
conduct, often with the conduct being the primary means of expression. These matters are 
generally referred to as "symbolic speech" and are among the least favored in free expression 
analysis. This sort of expression is considered to be of lower value than "pure speech," which is 
at the core of the clause. The expression in the present matter is of the "symbolic speech" 
category. In United States v. O'Brien. 391 U.S. 367 (1968), and Young v. American Mini 
Theatres, 427 U.S. 50 (1976), both discussed in greater detail below, the Court developed what 
has become known as a two-track or two-tier approach to address the regulation of expression 
deemed to have lower value. 
The American Mini Theatres case addressed a city ordinance requiring dispersal 
of adult theatres. The majority opinion, written by Justice Stevens, developed a theory that 
differing levels of speech warranted different degrees of First Amendment protection. The 
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communication involved in that case was determined to be of lower value than political speech, 
considered a core value of the First Amendment. This determination was assisted by the facts 
that although dispersed, the display of the type of films involved was not banned, and whatever 
message the film intended to communicate was unaffected by the ordinance. Justice Powell's 
concurrence focused on these two facts in concluding that the impact of the ordinance on First 
Amendment interests was incidental and minimal. The importance of these facts was 
underscored in Schad v. Borough of Mt. Ephraim. 452 U.S. 61 (1981), in which the Court 
invalidated an ordinance which banned all live entertainment. Where then does the conduct at 
issue in the present case fit in the analysis? 
In Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991), the Supreme Court upheld an 
ordinance which required dancers to wear pasties and a G-string. In that case the establishments 
in which the performances took place wished to provide totally nude dancing as entertainment 
and brought a preemptive strike to enjoin enforcement of the ordinance. The Court recognized 
that nude dancing is entitled to only the barest minimum of protection as expressive conduct and 
that the restrictions involved were reasonable time, place or manner requirements. The Court 
then applied a balancing test and expressly held that the "requirement that the dancers...must 
wear pasties and a G-string does not violate the First Amendment." By implication, the Court 
recognized that dancing as expressive conduct while required to wear pasties and a G-string is, 
like nude dancing, only marginally within the protection of the First Amendment. By analogy, 
the kind of dancing involved in the present case must also be considered only marginally 
protected. Even though the defendant was wearing somewhat more that the dancers in Barnes, in 
the day of Victoria's Secret "barely there" brassier and thong-type panties, it wasn't much more! 
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In her brief, the defendant cites, and attaches a copy of Pap's A.M. v. City of Erie, 
decided October 21, 1998, an opinion by the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, Western District. 
That court is an intermediate appellate court in Pennsylvania. In Pap's, the Pennsylvania court 
determined that the widely accepted holding of Barnes was all a mistake and Justice White's 
dissent was really the law. Of course, it should be noted that of the four dissenters in Barnes, 
only Justice Stevens remains on the Court. It seems that the Pennsylvania court decided that it 
wanted to reach a different result than Barnes would allow and then strained at a gnat and 
swallowed a camel to get there. Hardly persuasive. 
There is a line of cases based on California v. LaRue, 409 U.S. 109 (1972) — upholding 
restrictions on nude and semi-nude dancing in establishments which serve alcoholic beverages — 
which purport to permit the States broad authority under the Twenty-first Amendment to regulate 
activities which occur in establishments licensed to provide alcoholic beverages, notwithstanding 
First Amendment overlap. See for example New York Liquor Authority v. Bellanca, 452 U.S. 
714 (1981); Newport v. Iacobucci, 479 U.S. 92 (1986); Dodger's Bar & Grill, Inc. v. Johnson 
County Bd. of County Commissioners, 32 F.3d 1436 (10th Cir. (Kan.) 1994); and Tavern Talent 
v. Charnes, 607 F.Supp. 1415 (D.C. Colo. 1985). However, the reasoning of California v. 
LaRue, insofar as it relied on the Twenty-first Amendment to qualify First Amendment 
freedoms, was specifically disavowed in 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 116 S.Ct. 1495 
(1996). The Court specifically noted that only this aspect of the holding was disavowed. 
Therefore, notwithstanding the Court's disavowal in 44 Liquormart, there is yet much guidance 
that can be gleaned from LaRue and its progeny. 
For example, LaRue and those cases following it also held that dancing of the sort 
involved in the present matter is entitled to only the barest minimum of First Amendment 
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protection. Further, the Court in 44 Liquormart stated that it was persuaded that the "analysis in 
LaRue would have led to precisely the same result if it had placed no reliance on the Twenty-first 
Amendment." The Court recognized that the States' "inherent police powers" provided ample 
authority to restrict the activities described in LaRue regardless of whether alcoholic beverages 
were served. Therefore, given that the type of expressive activity involved in the present case is 
at best of the lower value "symbolic speech" category, it is only marginally protected under the 
First Amendment and is not entitled to strict scrutiny review. 
POINT 2. 
CHAPTER 5.28 OF THE SALT LAKE CITY CODE IS A 
REASONABLE TIME, PLACE AND MANNER REGULATION 
AND MEETS THE FOUR-PART TEST OF UNITED STATES V. O'BRIEN. 
The requirements contained in Chapter 5.28 of the Salt Lake City Code are, like the 
requirements in Barnes, reasonable time, place and manner requirements. Dancing as 
entertainment in establishments licensed to serve alcoholic beverages is not prohibited under the 
ordinance, it is merely regulated. The time, place and manner test was developed to evaluate 
restrictions on expression and was applied to conduct on private property in Renton v. Playtime 
Theatres. Inc.. 475 U.S. 41 (1986). Specifically, in Renton the Court held that since the 
ordinance in that case did not ban adult theaters altogether, it was properly analyzed as a form of 
time, place and manner regulation. The Court noted that content neutral time, place and manner 
regulations are acceptable so long as they are designed to serve a substantial governmental 
interest and do not unreasonably limit alternative avenues of communication. All of the attention 
placed by the defendant on what appears to be the Court's focus on "secondary effects" of the 
adult theatres is misplaced. All the court did in that discussion was articulate what it found to be 
the substantial governmental interest justifying the regulations in that case. As the Court 
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specifically noted in Barnes, and as the language clearly suggests in Renton, the test is applied in 
the same manner as the standards for evaluating "symbolic speech" or expressive conduct stated 
in United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968). Those standards were articulated in O'Brien 
as a four-part test: 
1. The law must be within the States' constitutional power; 
2. The law must further an important or substantial governmental interest; 
3. The governmental interest must be unrelated to the suppression of free expression; 
4. The incidental restriction on First Amendment freedom must be no greater than is 
essential to the furtherance of the governmental interest. 
Applying the four-part test to the facts in the instant case, the ordinance would have to be 
of a nature that is within the State's constitutional power and properly delegated to the city. As 
the Court noted in Barnes, public indecency statutes are of ancient origin and were designed to 
protect societal morality and public order. Further, as the Court observed in Barnes, the 
traditional police power of the State is defined as "the authority to provide for the public health, 
safety, and morals...." In addition, the Court noted that in Paris Adult Theatre I v. Slaton, 413 
U.S. 49 (1973), a case addressing whether an adult theatre had a right protected by the First 
Amendment to show films determined to be obscene, the authority of a legislature to act to 
protect the "social interest in order and morality" had been upheld. In Paris, Chief Justice Berger 
quoted from former Chief Justice Warren's dissent in an earlier obscenity case, Jacobellis v. 
Ohio, 378 U.S. 184 (1964), that there is a "right of the Nation and of the States to maintain a 
decent society." 
In U.C.A. §10-8-84, the State legislature empowered cities to pass ordinances which are 
"necessary and proper to provide for the safety and preserve the health, and promote the 
prosperity, improve the morals, peace and good order, comfort, and convenience of the city and 
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its inhabitants...." Section 10-8-84 authorizes cities to not only implement specific grants of 
authority, but also serves as an independent source of authority to act for the general welfare of 
its citizens. State v. Hutchinson, 624 P.2d 1116 (Utah 1980) (addressing the predecessor statute 
to §10-8-84). This provision serves as a legislative grant of a portion of the police power of the 
State to the city. Therefore, the ordinance in the present case is of a type traditionally within the 
police power of the State and that authority has been properly delegated to the city. 
Applying the second part of the O'Brien test to the present matter requires that the 
ordinance further an important or substantial governmental interest. In Barnes, the Court held 
that the public indecency statute in that case furthered a substantial interest in protecting order 
and morality. Thereby recognizing that protecting public order and morality is in itself a 
substantial governmental interest. The Court announced this conclusion as part of the same 
general discussion in which it concluded that the statute was within the police power of the State. 
Based on the same conclusion reached by the Court in Barnes, the ordinance at issue in the 
present case furthers an important or substantial interest in the general welfare by protecting 
public order and morality. As the Court stated in Renton, "A city's interest in attempting to 
preserve the quality of urban life...must be accorded high respect." While one may disagree 
with a State's efforts to "legislate morality", the Supreme Court has clearly upheld the authority 
of the State to do so and has identified the protection of public order and morality as a substantial 
interest of the State. 
The individual rights guaranteed in the Constitution are placed there, in part, to protect 
the minority against a "tyranny of the majority." But they also serve as benchmarks for the rights 
of the majority. Given that the protection of public order and morality is a substantial interest of 
the State, the question then becomes how much self-determination a community has to establish 
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reasonable time, place and manner requirements for certain business enterprises within its 
jurisdiction. Many communities, including this one as evidenced by the ordinance at issue, wish 
to exercise that degree of self-determination as far as is constitutionally permissible. So long as 
the requirements are within constitutional bounds, communities must be permitted the widest 
degree of latitude possible. In no other way can a people find their way through the decisional 
thicket that has grown up around such activities as those at issue in this case. 
In Paris, as in the present case, the defendant argued that there was no empirical data to 
substantiate a "secondary effects" motive to the regulation. The Court in Paris, as should the 
court in the present case, specifically rejected this argument. The Court noted that even though 
there was no conclusive proof of a connection between antisocial behavior and obscene material 
it had in earlier cases implicitly accepted that a legislature could legitimately act on such a 
conclusion in order to protect "the social interest in order and morality." Chief Justice Berger 
drew a compelling corollary to demonstrate that "From the beginning of civilized societies, 
legislators and judges have acted on various unprovable assumptions." First noting that we 
"accept the unprovable assumption that a complete education requires certain books and the well 
nigh universal belief that good books, plays, and art lift the spirit, improve the mind, enrich the 
human personality and develop character...." Then a legislature can equally draw from the sum 
of experience to "conclude that a sensitive, key relationship of human existence, central to family 
life, community welfare, and the development of human personality, can be debased and 
distorted by crass commercial exploitation of sex." Chief Justice Berger concluded that 
"Nothing in the Constitution prohibits a State from reaching such a conclusion and acting on it 
legislatively simply because there is no conclusive evidence or empirical [data]." The defendant 
in the present case also wishes to ignore that SGT Bailey of the Salt Lake City Police 
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Department Vice Unit testified that there had been some possible alcohol violations regarding 
this establishment that the officers were concerned about. R. 55 at 28. In addition, it is well 
understood that establishments such as the one involved in this case result in such secondary 
effects as prostitution, bar fights, and public intoxication. These are the kind of secondary effects 
that traditionally spillover into the surrounding community. 
Applying the third part of the O'Brien test to the present case requires that the 
governmental interest furthered by the ordinance be unrelated to the suppression of free 
expression. In Barnes, the Court held that the governmental interest in protecting order and 
morality was unrelated to the suppression of free expression. The defendants in Barnes argued 
that the State was banning nude dancing to prevent the erotic expression of the dance. The 
Court, in its wisdom, immediately saw through that argument noting that the erotic performance 
may be presented, so long as the performers wear the required amount of clothing. Therefore, 
the requirement that the performers wear the required clothing did not deprive the dance of its 
erotic message, if any, it simply made the message slightly less graphic. In the present matter, 
the performers may in fact dance and thereby present whatever message is contained in the 
conduct of the performance as long as the requirements of the ordinance, which includes 
licensing, no contact with patrons, minimum age, and minimum costume coverage, among other 
things, are met. The striking similarity between the Courts' analysis in Barnes and the 
requirements in the present matter demonstrates that the governmental interest in the present 
matter is also unrelated to the suppression of free expression. 
The fourth part of the O'Brien test requires that the incidental restriction on First 
Amendment freedom be no greater that is essential to the furtherance of the governmental 
interest. As identified above, the governmental interest served by the ordinance is the 
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preservation of public order and morality, the right to "maintain a decent society." The 
ordinance is narrowly tailored to achieve the fiirthersnce of the governmental interest and the 
time, place and manner restrictions are the minimum necessary to achieve that end. As the Court 
held in Barnes, when the restrictions are modest and the bare minimum necessary to achieve the 
State's purpose, the requirements meet the incidental restriction requirement. 
In Dodger's Bar & Grill the Tenth Circuit disagreed with the defendant's contention that 
since the Supreme Court in Barnes found that an ordinance requiring dancers to wear a G-string 
and pasties was constitutional, then an ordinance requiring any more physical coverage must be 
unconstitutional. Obviously, the Tenth Circuit determined that Barnes did not set a bright line 
rule regarding minimum requirements. The Tenth Circuit must have also read Mr. Justice 
White's dissent in Barnes, in which he suggests that if the State is concerned with ancillary 
problems that nude dancing could generate, the State could adopt other kinds of restrictions such 
as minimum distance requirements from patrons or hours limitations for performances. It must 
be remembered that in the ordinance at issue in the present case, dancing as entertainment in 
establishments licensed to serve alcoholic beverages is not prohibited. It is, however, controlled 
by way of reasonable time, place and manner regulations. Therefore, the ordinance does not 
unconstitutionally burden free expression. 
POINT 3. 
CHAPTER 5.28 OF THE SALT LAKE CITY CODE IS NOT 
VOID FOR VAGUENESS OR OVERBREADTH UNDER 
THE FIRST OR FOURTEENTH AMENDMENTS TO THE 
UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION. 
In her brief, the defendant appears to allege that the ordinance is vague and overbroad. 
The defendant made those same claims in the court below and initially tied the vagueness claim 
to the First Amendment and then asserted that the ordinance was so vague that it "cannot be 
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easily understood by someone trying to comply..." This latter language is generally related to a 
Fourteenth Amendment due process claim rather than the First Amendment. Given the 
vagueness of the void-for-vagueness position of the defense in the present matter, I will address 
the issue from both perspectives. 
In the free expression context, a vagueness issue may apply whenever the lack of notice 
in an ordinance might deter the exercise of a fundamental right. However, in the present matter 
the defendants are not prohibited from expressing themselves, they are merely required to do so 
in a less graphic way as a result of reasonable time, place and manner requirements. When there 
is no danger that the ordinance will deter lawful speech, as in the present matter, the Court has 
been less strict in enforcing vagueness. See for example, Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside. 
455 U.S. 489 (1982), which upheld statutes requiring a business to obtain a special license if it 
sells items designed or marketed for use with illegal drugs where the Court did not believe that 
the statute deterred constitutionally protected speech. However, even in this context the real 
issue is whether the statute or ordinance provides proper notice. 
Generally, due process requires that a statute or ordinance provide reasonably clear 
guidelines so that persons of ordinary intelligence can understand what conduct is prohibited and 
govern themselves accordingly, and so that arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement is 
discouraged. See Gravned v. City of Rockford. 408 U.S. 104 (1972); Salt Lake City v. Lopez. 
313 Utah Adv. Rep. 26 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). In Utah State Bar v. Petersen. 315 Utah Adv. Rep. 
38 (Utah 1997), the Utah Supreme Court noted that "Vagueness questions are essentially 
procedural due process issues, i.e., whether the statute adequately notices the proscribed 
conduct." In Petersen, the Court concluded, citing State v. Theobald. 645 P.2d 50 (Utah 1982), 
that "a statute is not unconstitutionally vague if it is sufficiently explicit to inform the ordinary 
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reader what conduct is prohibited." The emphasis in each of the preceding quotations should be 
placed on the terms "adequately" and "sufficiently." In the present matter, the ordinance clearly 
requires a license to perform as an entertainer in an establishment licensed to serve alcoholic 
beverages; the costume coverage requirements are clearly and specifically delineated; the 
prohibition against patron contact is clearly and specifically expressed; and the other 
requirements are similarly cast in plain language. It isn't that the defendant could not understand 
or determine what the requirements of the ordinance were; it's simply that she chose to ignore 
them. On its face, the ordinance is not "so ambiguous as to make reasonable minds guess as to 
its meaning." State v. Mohi. 901 P.2d 991, 1006 (Utah 1995). Therefore, the ordinance is not 
unconstitutionally vague. 
Generally, an overbroad statute or ordinance is one that is designed to burden or punish 
activities that are not constitutionally protected, but which includes within its scope activities 
which are protected. The requirement is that the statute or ordinance be narrowly tailored so that 
it does not unconstitutionally restrict protected activities. In the context of the First Amendment, 
it has been suggested that a statute should be stricken as overbroad only if it is "substantially 
overbroad and not readily reconstructed to avoid privileged activity." Note, The First 
Amendment Overbreadth Doctrine, 83 Harv. L. Rev. 844, 918 (1970). The author of the note 
quoted above reasoned that unless the statute is not substantially overbroad, it is unlikely to have 
sufficient inhibitory impact. In Broadrick v. Oklahoma, 413 U.S. 601 (1973), the Court noted 
that the overbreadth doctrine is limited at the outset and attenuates as the behavior moves from 
"pure speech" toward conduct (symbolic speech). The Court concluded, "To put the matter 
another way, particularly where conduct and not merely speech is involved, we believe that the 
overbreadth of a statute must not only be real, but substantial as well, judged in relation to the 
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statutes' plainly legitimate sweep." Later in the opinion, the Court offered a more specific test 
when it said that it would invalidate a statute for overbreadth "only when the flaw is a substantial 
concern in the context of the statute as a whole." 413 U.S. at 616 n. 14. Given that the ordinance 
is narrowly tailored so as to not prohibit protected activity- the dancing itself-while burdening 
unprotected activities—the lewd aspects of the conduct—in the least restrictive means necessary to 
achieve the legitimate governmental interest, the ordinance is not unconstitutionally overbroad. 
As the discussion above demonstrates, after balancing the First Amendment concerns of 
the defendants against the reasonable time, place and manner requirements of the ordinance at 
issue in the present matter, and considering the clarity and scope of the ordinance, the ordinance 
does not violate the First Amendment. 
POINT 4. 
CHAPTER 5.28 OF THE SALT LAKE CITY CODE DOES NOT VIOLATE THE 
EQUAL PROTECTION REQUIREMENTS OF THE FOURTEENTH 
AMENDMENT TO THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION. 
In her brief, the defendant alleges, somewhat vaguely, that the ordinance at issue in the 
present matter violates the Equal Protection guarantees of the Constitution. The equal protection 
clause guarantees that similar individuals will be dealt with in a similar manner by the 
government. It does not reject the government's ability to classify persons or to "draw lines" in 
the enactment and application of laws, but it does guarantee that those classifications will not be 
based upon impermissible criteria or arbitrarily used to burden a group of individuals. If the 
court finds in its analysis of the First Amendment issue that the ordinance does promote a 
substantial and important governmental interest, as it should, then the resolution of the equal 
protection issue is axiomatic. The ordinance is rationally related to a legitimate governmental 
interest; it does not establish classifications based upon any of the recognized impermissible 
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interest; it does not establish classifications based upon any of the recognized impermissible 
criteria; and it deals with anyone who wishes to perform as a dancer in an establishment licensed 
to serve alcoholic beverages in identical fashion. There is simply no equal protection issue. 
POINT 5. 
CHAPTER 5.28 OF THE SALT LAKE CITY CODE DOES NOT VIOLATE 
ARTICLE I, SECTION 15 OF THE UTAH STATE CONSTITUTION. 
In her brief, the defendant alleges that the Utah State Constitution provides for additional 
free speech protections. However, the defendant wrongly relies on two cases. The first case is 
Citv of Portland v. Tidvman. 759 P.2d 242 (Or. 1988), in which the Oregon Supreme Court, 
under the authority of the Oregon State Constitution, invalidated a zoning distance requirement 
on adult businesses. Of course, the United States Supreme Court has upheld various distance and 
zoning requirements under the Federal Constitution. See Renton and American Mini Theatres, 
cited above in the discussion of the First Amendment issues. It has always been recognized that 
if a State desires to afford its citizens additional protections in certain areas of the law for which 
it determines that the State Constitution provides an adequate and independent basis, it may do 
so. The fact that the Oregon Supreme Court finds an adequate and independent basis in its State 
Constitution to permit clustering of adult businesses in that State means absolutely nothing in the 
case at hand. Second, the defendant relies on West v. Thompson Newspapers. 872 P.2d 999 
(Utah 1994). In that case the Utah Supreme Court stated that "the Utah Constitution provides an 
independent source of protection for expressions of opinion and note that our conclusion is 
supported by decisions of sibling states construing similar constitutional provisions." First, the 
West case involved the free expression of a political opinion in a newspaper. As discussed 
above, expressions of such opinions in the printed form occupies a preferred position in free 
speech analysis. That's not this case. Second, as discussed above, States may find an adequate 
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and independent basis for various protections in their State Constitutions. However, an adequate 
and independent basis doesn't necessarily mean a broader basis or afford greater protection that 
that found under the Federal Constitution. It simply means an additional basis. Lastly, the 1988 
Oregon case the defense counsel cites is not among those cases cited by the Utah Court as a 
supporting decision of a sibling state in West. In fact, it isn't cited in West at all. That's 
probably because it isn't relevant to the issue relating to the expression of an opinion in a 
newspaper. The defendant cites no Utah authority that suggests the Utah Constitution provides 
greater protection to the conduct involved in the present case than the United States Constitution 
— and none should be found. Lastly, the defendant has not articulated any explanation as to how 
or why the court's analysis under the Utah Constitution should differ from the federal counterpart 
in this area. In other contexts the court has held that if a party fails to support her state 
constitutional arguments with analysis and legal authority, the appellate court will not address 
them. State v. Roth, 827 P.2d 255 (Utah Ct. App. 1992); State v. Carter, 812 P.2d 460 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1991). The defendant's deferral to the reasoning in the Oregon case is insufficient to 
support her state constitutional claim here and the court should decline to address them. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, the plaintiff respectfully requests that the conviction of the 
defendant for engaging in an activity for which a license is required without having first obtained 
such license, in violation of § 5.28.030 of the Salt Lake City Code, be AFFIRMED. 
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